One of the most controversial procedural issues under the GST regime is the limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The issue has become extremely significant in practical GST litigation because a large number of adjudication orders are either uploaded on the GST portal without effective communication, passed ex parte, or noticed by taxpayers only at the stage of recovery proceedings. In many situations, by the time the taxpayer becomes aware of the order or is able to obtain proper legal advice, the statutory period for filing appeal already stands expired. This has resulted in extensive litigation before various High Courts on the question whether delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 107 can still be condoned by constitutional courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Section 107 of the CGST Act prescribes the appellate limitation framework. Under Section 107(1), an appeal against an adjudication order is required to be filed within three months from the date of communication of the order. Section 107(4) further empowers the Appellate Authority to condone delay only for a further period of one month if sufficient cause is shown by the appellant. Thus, the statute effectively creates a maximum outer limitation period of four months. Once this period expires, Appellate Authorities generally refuse to entertain appeals on the ground that they lack jurisdiction to condone any further delay.
Unlike several other enactments where wider condonation powers are specifically conferred upon appellate forums, the GST law adopts a comparatively rigid limitation structure. Consequently, the issue that arose before constitutional courts was whether such statutory limitation completely extinguishes the remedy itself or whether constitutional courts can still intervene in exceptional circumstances to prevent miscarriage of justice.
The jurisprudence on this issue substantially developed after the judgment of the Supreme Court in . In this case, the Supreme Court held that where a statute provides a specific appellate remedy along with a prescribed limitation period, the High Court should ordinarily refrain from entertaining writ petitions merely because the statutory appeal has become time-barred. The Court observed that entertaining writ petitions as a substitute for statutory appeals would defeat legislative intent and render limitation provisions meaningless.
However, the Supreme Court did not completely prohibit exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Court clarified that constitutional courts may still interfere in exceptional cases involving jurisdictional errors, violation of principles of natural justice, abuse of process, or situations resulting in manifest injustice. Therefore, the judgment discouraged routine bypassing of statutory remedies but did not extinguish the extraordinary constitutional powers of High Courts.
Following the Glaxo Smith Kline judgment, certain High Courts adopted a strict interpretation and held that once the statutory period prescribed under Section 107 expires, no relief should ordinarily be granted. One of the leading judgments reflecting this approach is the decision of the . In this case, the petitioner sought condonation of substantial delay beyond the statutory period. The Gujarat High Court refused to exercise writ jurisdiction and held that allowing such petitions would render Section 107 otiose and defeat the legislative scheme consciously enacted by Parliament.
In para 20 of the Judgment Gujarat High Court held as under
Section 107 (4) of the Act grants discretion to the Appellate Authority, to allow additional one month in case he/she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by "sufficient cause" from presenting the appeal after 90 days, but within a period of 30 days. Thus, the discretion of the Appellate authority ends on the completion of additional 30 days. Such discretion does not extend to powers under Article NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/386/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/01/2026 undefined 226 of the Constitution on India as well. The statute, thus provides additional one month to file the appeal, and all the reasons satisfying the expression "sufficient cause" can be raised by the appellant. Similar expression is found in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 29 of Limitation Act, 1963 which deals with "Savings", which prevents the overriding the provisions of specific statutes that have their own distinct limitation periods. It permits such laws to govern their own timelines while still leveraging the mechanics of the Limitation Act. Thus, when an additional period of 30 days is supplied by the statute over and above the basic period of 90 days, and the same stands exhausted, this Court cannot exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to dilute the intention of the legislature and further extend the limitation by condoning the delay by re-examining the "sufficient cause". The reason assigned by the appellant is also not palatable, as it is hard to believe, that in todays, era, the appellant and his accountant are not having the knowledge of operating the computers, and hence they did not verify the order DRC-07. We clarify, that even if the appellant had a valid reason and sufficient cause explaining the delay, this Court cannot condone the delay beyond 120 days. The tax payers are supposed to remain vigilant of all the proceedings and have to timely verify the orders on the portal. The taxing statutes operate in very strict time frame, and any relaxation or easing of limitation period will have cascading effect on the functioning of the revenue.
The Court emphasized that limitation provisions in fiscal statutes are substantive in nature and are intended to bring certainty and finality to tax administration. It was observed that constitutional powers should not be exercised in a manner that effectively rewrites the statutory limitation framework.
A similar approach was adopted by the Gujarat High Court in where even a short delay beyond the maximum condonable period was not condoned. These judgments indicate that Gujarat High Court generally follows a strict statutory interpretation and discourages writ petitions filed solely for condonation of delay beyond Section 107. In para 16 of the judgement Gujarat High Court held as under
In view of the settled legal precedence, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India condoning the delay of six days. So far as the challenge of Order-in-Original is concerned, once the petitioner has availed its alternative efficacious remedy of filing the appeal, this Court cannot call back and examine the Order-in-Original. The petitioner had an opportunity to assail the same by filing the writ petition in case the Order-in-Original was in violation of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction. Having availed the remedy of filing an appeal as the petitioner was aware that none of the issues either with regard to violation of the principles of natural justice or lack of jurisdiction was involved and the issue was only confined with the facts that and the appropriate remedy was to file an appeal as provided under the statute, this Court cannot examine the validity or legality of the Order-in-Original.
In contrast to the strict approach, several High Courts have adopted a more liberal constitutional interpretation recognizing the distinction between the limited powers of statutory authorities and the plenary powers of constitutional courts.
A landmark judgment representing this approach is the decision of the in The Court held that although the Appellate Authority is undoubtedly bound by Section 107(4) and cannot condone delay beyond the statutory period, the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not similarly restricted. The Court emphasized that constitutional courts retain residual powers to ensure that procedural technicalities do not result in complete denial of justice.
The Rajasthan High Court made a significant distinction between “statutory limitation” and “constitutional jurisdiction.” According to the Court, while the statute may restrict the powers of the Appellate Authority, it cannot altogether extinguish the extraordinary powers vested in constitutional courts for ensuring fairness and justice. Court held as under in relevant paras
Reverting to the case in hand, as far as explanation qua the sufficient cause leading to the delay in filing the statutory appeal in the present case, we are of the opinion that the petitioner had filed his duly sworn affidavit stating therein that it was due to the fault of the counsel/consultant accountant, who was interested with the responsibility of handling these matters, since, the same requires the expertise of a professional and therefore, they were under the bonefide belief that the needful is being carried out in the consultant counsel.
It is stated in the affidavit that it was due to the lack of communication and proper advisory on the part of the counsel/consultant accountant that the petitioner was deprived of taking timely steps to file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. Merely, because an objection was taken by the respondents that the affidavit of the petitioner is not accompanied (Uploaded on 22/01/2026 at 05:32:06 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:485-DB] (16 of 16) [CW-4558/2025] by supporting affidavit of his consultant accountant/counsel, an act beyond the control of the petitioner, due to change of his counsel by him, the stand taken by petitioner cannot be given a short shrift.
Taking a wholesome view, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned appellate order dated 11.10.2024 is set aside. Delay of 160 in filing of the appeal is condoned in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India. The appeal is remanded to the appellate authority for adjudication on merits in accordance with law.
A similar liberal approach has been adopted by the In para 7 of the judgement court held as under-
The aforesaid facts and circumstances clearly establish that the petitioner had made out valid and sufficient ground/cause to condone the delay in preferring the appeal before the appellate Authority. It is also clear that the inability and omission on the part of the petitioner to prefer the appeal within the prescribed period was due to bonafide reasons, unavoidable circumstances and sufficient cause. Though it is well settled that Respondent No.1-Appellate Authority does not have power to condone the delay beyond the extended/condonable period of 30 days after expiry of the initial period of 60 days, by adopting justice oriented approach and in order to do complete and substantial justice, in the peculiar/special facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case and in the light of the material on record which clearly establishes that the delay in preferring the appeal was wholly unintentional and due to valid and sufficient grounds referred to supra coupled with the fact that the petitioner has a good case to urge on merits and the balance of convenience in its favour and in view of the judgment of the Division Bench in Simplex Infrastructure's case supra, I deem it just and appropriate to exercise my powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and condone the delay in preferring the appeal by the petitioner by setting aside the impugned order at Annexure-A and remit the matter back to respondent No.1 for reconsideration of the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law.
An entirely different legal dimension was introduced by the In this judgment, the Court held that Section 107 of the CGST Act does not expressly exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions relating to condonation of delay continue to apply to GST appeals.
The Calcutta High Court therefore concluded that even the Appellate Authority itself possesses power to condone delay beyond the additional one-month period prescribed under Section 107(4). This interpretation substantially enlarges the powers of GST appellate authorities and is considerably more taxpayer-friendly.
Subsequent decisions of the Calcutta High Court have consistently followed this principle and directed Appellate Authorities to consider applications for condonation of delay on merits even beyond the statutory period. However, this view has not received universal acceptance and several other High Courts have expressly disagreed with it.
The controversy surrounding the Calcutta High Court judgments fundamentally revolves around whether the CGST Act impliedly excludes the Limitation Act. Those opposing applicability of Section 5 argue that once Parliament itself prescribed a specific condonable period under Section 107(4), the legislative intention clearly indicates exclusion of any wider condonation powers. On the other hand, the contrary argument is that in absence of an express exclusion clause, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act permits application of Section 5 to GST appellate proceedings.
Presently, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, reliance solely on this interpretation may involve considerable litigation risk because many High Courts continue to treat Section 107 as a complete code governing appellate limitation.
From a practical litigation perspective, one of the most important aspects is the manner in which the writ petition is drafted. A writ petition framed merely as a request for “condonation of delay” may face serious resistance, particularly in jurisdictions following the strict interpretation approach. Therefore, in most cases, the better strategy is to challenge the adjudication order itself on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds rather than presenting the matter as a pure limitation issue.
The writ petition should focus on aspects such as violation of principles of natural justice, non-service or improper communication of the order, absence of opportunity of hearing, portal-related procedural defects, lack of jurisdiction, non-speaking adjudication, mechanical confirmation of demand, or failure to consider replies and documents placed on record. The emphasis should therefore shift from seeking mere condonation of delay to demonstrating that the impugned proceedings themselves suffer from serious legal infirmities requiring constitutional intervention.
Judicial trends indicate that High Courts are generally more inclined to exercise writ jurisdiction where the taxpayer establishes genuine and exceptional circumstances. Courts have shown greater willingness to interfere in situations where the order was never properly communicated, where the taxpayer became aware of the order only during recovery proceedings, where portal glitches prevented timely filing, where adjudication was conducted ex parte without proper hearing, or where substantial financial consequences are involved.
Conversely, where the delay is grossly unexplained, attributable to negligence, or reflects deliberate inaction, courts generally decline to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226.
The issue also involves broader constitutional considerations. GST adjudication directly affects valuable civil and property rights, business operations, banking facilities, and commercial reputation. Therefore, where procedural rigidity results in complete denial of appellate remedy despite existence of substantial merits, constitutional courts may intervene to preserve fairness and prevent miscarriage of justice.
The evolving jurisprudence on this issue reflects the continuing judicial effort to balance two competing principles. On one side lies the requirement of certainty and discipline in fiscal administration, while on the other lies the constitutional obligation to ensure that procedural technicalities do not extinguish substantive justice.
In the author’s respectful view, the liberal constitutional approach adopted by Rajasthan and Karnataka High Courts appears to be more balanced and legally sustainable. Section 107 undoubtedly restricts the powers of the Appellate Authority; however, constitutional powers vested in High Courts under Article 226 cannot be interpreted in an unduly narrow manner so as to permit grave injustice merely because of procedural limitation.
At the same time, unrestricted exercise of writ jurisdiction may undermine legislative discipline and encourage casual litigation conduct. Therefore, constitutional intervention should remain confined to genuine and exceptional cases where denial of remedy would result in manifest injustice.
The Calcutta High Court approach applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act is conceptually attractive and highly beneficial from the taxpayer’s perspective. However, unless the issue is conclusively settled by the Supreme Court, the applicability of this interpretation may remain confined largely to jurisdictions following the Calcutta view.
From a practical GST litigation perspective, especially in Gujarat, taxpayers should avoid presenting matters merely as “delay condonation cases.” The challenge should instead be structured around constitutional infirmities in the adjudication process itself. This approach significantly improves the prospects of obtaining relief under Article 226.
Ultimately, the jurisprudence demonstrates that while statutory limitation may restrict the powers of appellate authorities, constitutional courts continue to retain residual jurisdiction to ensure that procedural limitations do not altogether defeat substantive justice
The information contained in this article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, tax, or professional advice. Each case requires specific evaluation based on facts and applicable laws. Readers are advised to seek professional advice before taking any action.